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The effect of analyst coverage on accounting conservatism 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study examines whether high analyst coverage increases or decreases 
accounting conservatism.   
Design/methodology/approach – This study selects sample firms from the Compustat 
and I/B/E/S databases for years 1989-2006.  We use both accrual-based and market-
value-based measures of accounting conservatism.  We also use the extent to which 
negative cash flow from operations is more timely recognized via accruals than positive 
cash flow from operations to measure accounting conservatism.  The regression analyses 
are conducted to test the hypotheses. 
Findings – We find strong evidence that analyst coverage is positively associated with 
accounting conservatism.  The results suggest that firms choose more conservative 
accounting methods when they are followed by more analysts than when they are 
followed by fewer analysts.  The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses.   
Originality/value – This study sheds light on how analyst coverage affects firms’ 
accounting choices.  We extend the limited research on the monitoring role of analyst 
coverage.  Our findings are consistent with the notion that analyst coverage plays an 
important corporate governance role in the financial reporting process.  This study also 
adds to the literature on the economic determinants of accounting conservatism, and 
provides some implications for practitioners.   
Keywords  Analyst coverage, Accounting conservatism, Corporate governance. 
Paper type  Research paper 
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1.        Introduction 
 
           Conservative accounting recognizes losses as they are discovered, but defers gains 
until they are verified.  Consequently, bad news is more timely reflected in accounting 
earnings than good news.  Accounting conservatism can reduce agency problems arising 
from managers’ opportunistic use of accounting discretion.  Prior research (e.g., Watts, 
1993; Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008) investigates the economic consequence of 
accounting conservatism.  These studies suggest that accounting conservatism can 
increase the efficiency of contracts written between conflicted parties.  Prior research also 
examines the economic determinants of accounting conservatism.  For example, Ahmed 
and Duellman (2007) find that board governance quality is positively associated with 
accounting conservatism.  Likewise, Garcia Lara et al. (2009) document a positive 
association between accounting conservatism and a composite measure of corporate 
governance quality.  These studies suggest that strong corporate governance may lead to 
more conservative accounting.   
           Analysts play an information intermediary role in the capital market because their 
work involves interpreting, acquiring, and communicating information for other market 
participants.  These information intermediary duties facilitate analysts to monitor the 
management.  Analysts can effectively scrutinize firms’ financial reporting because they 
have great experience on tracking corporate financial statements and substantial industry-
wide knowledge.  Recently, Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007) find that firms with high 
analyst coverage engage in less earnings management than do firms with low analyst 
coverage, suggesting that analysts play an important monitoring role in financial 
reporting.  Analyst coverage may directly or indirectly affect managers’ accounting 
choices.  Analysts can directly monitor the management by issuing research reports and 
raising questions when they interact with the management.  Analysts may also indirectly 
monitor the management by alerting other corporate governance mechanisms including 
board of directors and external auditors so that the later ones can more effectively 
monitor firms’ financial reporting.   Thus, high analyst coverage may lead to high 
accounting conservatism if analyst coverage serves as a corporate governance role.        
           On the other hand, high analyst coverage can mitigate information asymmetry 
between managers and outside investors as analysts play an information intermediary 
role.  LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that accounting conservatism can reduce managers’ 
incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and so reduce information 
asymmetry.  They find that firms with more information asymmetry demand more 
accounting conservatism.  Their findings suggest that high analyst coverage may lead to a 
low demand for accounting conservatism because information asymmetry is low for 
firms with high analyst coverage.   Therefore, it is not clear whether high analyst 
coverage increases or decreases accounting conservatism.  If analysts’ monitoring role 
dominates over their information intermediary role in firms’ accounting choices, we 
expect a positive association between analyst coverage and accounting conservatism.  
However, analyst coverage will be negatively associated with accounting conservatism if 
the effect of analysts’ information intermediary role on accounting choices is greater than 
that of analysts’ monitoring role.    
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           This study examines whether high analyst coverage increases or decreases 
accounting conservatism.  Using a sample of 9,924 firm-year observations over the 
period 1989 to 2006, we document strong evidence that firms adopt more conservative 
accounting when they are followed by more analysts than when they are followed by 
fewer analysts.  The results still hold after allowing for the autocorrelation of time-series 
data, the endogeneity of analyst coverage, the potential confounding effects of competing 
corporate governance mechanisms, and using asymmetric loss recognition test.  These 
findings are consistent with the notion that analyst coverage plays an important corporate 
governance role in the financial reporting process.   
           This study contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, this study 
sheds light on how analyst coverage affects firms’ accounting choices.  Since whether 
analyst coverage positively or negatively affects accounting conservatism is not clear in 
the literature, it is warranted to make some clarifications on this issue.  Second, this study 
extends the limited research on the monitoring role of analyst coverage.  Unlike Yu 
(2008) and Knyazeva (2007), we focus on conservative accounting choices.  This study 
provides further evidence on analysts’ governance role by examining the relationship 
between analyst coverage and accounting conservatism.  Third, this study also adds to the 
literature on the economic determinants of accounting conservatism.  Although prior 
research (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2009) finds that high 
quality corporate governance increases accounting conservatism, this is the first study to 
examine whether governance mechanism arising from analyst coverage affects 
accounting conservatism.  This study provides further evidence to support the argument 
that there exists a positive impact of corporate governance on accounting conservatism.   
           The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the economic determinants of accounting conservatism.  Section 3 discusses role of 
analysts.  Section 4 develops the hypotheses.  Section 5 addresses the research design.  
Section 6 presents empirical results.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.        Economic determinants of accounting conservatism 
 
           There is a growing literature that examines the economic determinants of 
accounting conservatism.  Ahmed et al. (2002) investigate the relationship between 
accounting conservatism and bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy.  
They find that firms facing more severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend 
policy adopt more conservative accounting.  Lobo and Zhou (2006) examine whether the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act affects accounting conservatism.  They document 
evidence on an increase in conservatism in financial reporting following the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine whether legal and political 
institutions affect financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting.  They find 
that accounting is more conservative in countries with both high quality judicial regimes 
and high relative usage of private bonds, and in countries with both high quality judicial 
regimes and more diffuse ownership structures.    
           Ahmed and Duellman (2007) examine the association between accounting 
conservatism and board characteristics.  They find that accounting conservatism is 
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positively associated with the proportion of outside directors and the percentage of 
outside directors’ shareholding, suggesting that accounting conservatism can assist 
outside directors in reducing agency costs.  Using a sample of listed companies in Spain, 
Garcia Lara et al. (2007) find that accounting conservatism decreases in the CEO’s 
influence over the board of directors, measured by board characteristics including board 
size, the proportion of non-executive directors, the proportion of independent directors, 
the existence of a executive board chairman, and the existence of an audit committee, a 
nomination or remuneration committee, and an executive committee.  Chung and Wynn 
(2008) investigate the effect of managerial legal liability coverage on accounting 
conservatism.  Using directors’ and officers’ liability insurance coverage and cash for 
indemnification as a proxy for managerial legal liability coverage, they find that 
accounting earnings are less conservative for firms with high managerial legal liability 
coverage than for firms with low managerial legal liability coverage.  
           Jenkins and Velury (2008) examine whether auditor tenure affects accounting 
conservatism, and find that earnings conservatism is positively associated with the length 
of the auditor-client relationship.  LaFond and Watts (2008) find that accounting 
conservatism increases in information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors.  Their findings suggest that firms with high information asymmetry have a 
higher demand for conservatism in financial reporting.  LaFond and Roychowdhury 
(2008) argue that the high severity of agency problem increases the demand for 
accounting conservatism, and find a negative association between managerial ownership 
and accounting conservatism.  Using a composite measure of corporate governance, 
Garcia Lara et al. (2009) also find that stronger corporate governance is associated with a 
high degree of accounting conservatism in U.S.  Nichols et al. (2009) examine whether 
there is a difference in the degree of accounting conservatism between public and private 
banks.  They find that public banks adopt more conservative accounting than private 
banks as the former faces greater agency costs.  
 
3.        Role of analysts 
 
           Analysts play an information intermediary role in the capital market as they can 
interpret public information, and acquire and convey private information to investors 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001).  There is a large body of research that examines the 
information intermediary role of analysts.  For instance, Hong et al. (2000) examine 
whether analyst coverage affects the profitability of momentum strategies.  They find that 
momentum strategies are less profitable for firms with high analyst coverage, suggesting 
that information about those firms is more available to the investing public.  Ayers and 
Freeman (2003) investigate the association between analyst coverage and the pricing of 
future earnings, and document that prices incorporate future earnings earlier for firms 
with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage.  Frankel and Li 
(2004) use insider trading profits as a proxy for information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors.  They find that insider trading profits are lower when 
firms have high analyst coverage.  These studies suggest that the information 
intermediary role of analysts mitigates information asymmetry.    
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           Analysts can also monitor financial reporting in the process of information 
intermediary.  For example, analysts can interact directly with the management and raise 
questions in earnings release conferences.  Since analysts have great experience on 
tracking corporate financial statements and substantial industry-wide knowledge, they 
can effectively scrutinize firms’ financial reporting.  Thus, analyst coverage can act as a 
magnifying lens of managerial opportunism.  Dyck et al. (2006) find that analysts are 
more likely to detect corporate fraud than the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
auditors.  This suggests that analyst coverage is an effective channel to monitor 
managers.  
           Although analysts can play an important corporate governance role, the research 
on this topic is limited in the literature.  The governance role of analyst coverage has 
been investigated by Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007).  Yu (2008) examines whether 
analyst coverage affects earnings management.  He finds that analyst coverage is 
negatively associated with the level of discretionary accruals, suggesting that firms 
followed by more analysts engage in less earning management than firms followed by 
fewer analysts.  Moreover, he finds that firms with high analyst coverage are less likely 
to just beat or meet earnings benchmarks than firms with low analyst coverage, consistent 
with the results based on discretionary accruals.  Knyazeva (2007) investigates the effect 
of analyst coverage on firm behavior.  She also documents a negative association 
between analyst coverage and earnings management, and argues that analyst coverage 
can serve as a partial substitute to other governance mechanisms in constraining earnings 
management.              
 
4.        Hypotheses development 
 
           Agency costs can be mitigated by writing contracts between the parties with 
conflicting interests.  Since accounting numbers are used in the contracts, managers may 
have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting policies to defer (expedite) the 
recognition of losses (gains) at the expense of some parties’ interests.  As a result, 
contracting itself cannot fully solve the agency problems.  Corporate governance 
mechanisms can improve the efficiency of contracts and reduce agency problems by 
monitoring firms’ financial reporting.  Watts (1993) suggests that accounting 
conservatism increases the efficiency of debt contracts written between shareholders and 
bondholders.  Accounting conservatism can also reduce managers’ short-term behavior to 
expropriate shareholders’ wealth because conservative accounting has the propensity to 
recognize losses earlier and gains later (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  Thus, accounting 
conservatism is an important way to reduce agency costs, which is expected in a strong 
corporate governance environment.  Consistent with this notion, Garcia Lara et al. (2009) 
document evidence that strong corporate governance leads to more accounting 
conservatism.  Since analyst coverage serves as a corporate governance mechanism 
through issuing research reports and raising questions when analysts interact with 
managers, firms with high analyst coverage are more likely to have high corporate 
governance quality and so adopt more conservative accounting.   
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           Analysts’ reputations and compensation depend on the quality of their research 
and the accuracy of their forecasts and recommendations.  Analysts have incentives to 
search for private information in order to increase their job performance.  Through 
acquiring private information, analysts may enhance the effectiveness of firms’ other 
corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring financial reporting.  For example, bad 
news can be more quickly communicated to the public by analysts when firms are 
followed by more analysts.  This will give a warning signal to outside directors and 
external auditors in these firms that they should be concerned with the firms’ accounting 
treatment of bad news.  Thus, bad news could be more quickly incorporated into 
accounting numbers when firms have high analyst coverage.  Based on the above 
discussions, we hypothesize that firms with high analyst coverage adopt more 
conservative accounting than do firms with low analyst coverage.  The first hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
       H1    Analyst coverage is positively associated with accounting conservatism.  
           While monitoring financial reporting, analysts also interpret and produce 
information to the investing public.  Prior research (e.g., Hong et al., 2000; Frankel and 
Li, 2004) suggests that high analyst coverage can reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors.  LaFond and Watts (2008) examine the effect of 
information asymmetry on accounting conservatism.  They find that firms with more 
information asymmetry adopt more conservative accounting than do firms with less 
information asymmetry.  Since high analyst coverage leads to less information 
asymmetry, we also hypothesize that accounting is less conservative for firms with high 
analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage.  Thus, the second hypothesis 
is developed as follows: 
         H2. Analyst coverage is negatively associated with accounting conservatism.  
 
 
5.       Research design 
 
5.1     Data collection 
          We begin to select all firm-year observations over the period 1988 to 2007 from the 
Compustat’s industrial annual data file.1  Since data for year t-1 to t+1 are used for 
computing the measure of accounting conservatism at year t, the sample period for testing 
the hypothesis is 1989 to 2006.  Next, the raw sample from Compustat is merged with the 
I/B/E/S detail file to identify firms that are covered by both Compustat and I/B/E/S.  
After excluding observations with missing data for computing accrual-based measure of 
accounting conservatism and independent variables used in the main analysis, the final 
sample consists of 9,924 firm-year observations over the period 1989 to 2006.   
         Table I reports the frequency and percent of sample firms for each two-digit SIC 
industry from which there are at least 100 observations in the sample.  Industries 
including business services (17.86%), electrical and electronic equipment (11.32%), 
industrial machinery and equipment (10.42%), instruments and related products 
(9.67%), and chemicals and allied products (9.52%) are most widely represented in the 
sample.  In addition, the sample size is reduced to 5,148 firm-year observations when 
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market-value-based measure of accounting conservatism is used for testing the 
hypothesis.2 
 
Table I. Distribution of sample firms across industries 
        
Two-Digit SIC Codes Industry Description Frequency Percent(%) 
20 Food products 219 2.21 
28 Chemicals and allied products 945 9.52 
30 Rubber and plastics products  138 1.39 
34 Fabricated metal products 113 1.14 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 1,034 10.42 
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 1,123 11.32 
37 Transportation equipment 245 2.47 
38 Instruments and related products 960 9.67 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 197 1.99 
48 Communications 172 1.73 
53 General merchandise stores  208 2.10 
54 Food stores 113 1.14 
55 Automotive dealers and gasoline service 113 1.14 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 418 4.21 
57 Home furniture and equipment stores 255 2.57 
58 Eating and drinking places 346 3.49 
59 Miscellaneous retail 461 4.65 
73 Business services 1,772 17.86 
79 Amusement and recreation services 133 1.34 
Others   959 9.62 
Total  9,924 100 
    
5.2     Measure of accounting conservatism 
          Following Ahmed et al. (2002), we use both an accrual-based and a market-value-
based measure of accounting conservatism.  The accrual-based measure of accounting 
conservatism (i.e., CONAC) is computed as the mean of total accruals deflated by total 
assets for year t-1 to t+1 where t is the year of interest, multiplied by -1.3  Like Givoly 
and Hayn (2000), we measure total accruals as net income before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation less cash flow from operations.4  Since CONAC increases in the amount 
of negative accruals, a high value of CONAC indicates a high level of accounting 
conservatism.    
           The market-value-based measure of accounting conservatism (i.e., CONBM) is 
computed by estimating the following fixed-effect regression model:  
                itkit
k
ktiit RETBM εβααα ++++= −
=
∑
6
0
                                  (1)                    
where 
               BM  it     = the book-to-market ratio for firm i at year t,   
               RET it - k = the stock return (including dividends) for firm i at year t-k. 
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           Equation (1) is estimated for year t-1 to t+1, where t is the year of interest.5  αi is 
the firm-specific bias component of the book-to-market ratio, which reflects a firm’s 
accounting conservatism relative to the other firms in the sample.  α t is the year-specific 
bias component of the book-to-market ratio.  Based on prior research (e.g., Beaver and 
Ryan, 2000; Ahmed et al., 2002), CONBM is measured as αi, multiplied by -1.  High 
accounting conservatism is expected to yield higher values of CONBM.  
 
5.3      Regression analysis 
           The following regression model is used for testing the hypotheses: 
          CON = b0 +b1ANALYST + b2DIV + b3DEBT + b4ROA + b5SIZE + b6SGROW  
                    + b7 RDADV + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε                   (2) 
where 
            CON = accounting conservatism, measured by either CONAC or CONBM, 
    ANALYST = analyst coverage, measured as the total number of analysts who issue  
                        forecasts of year t+1’s earnings per share for a firm during year t (Yu,  
                        2008), 
             DIV = common dividends divided by total assets,  
          DEBT = long-term debt divided by total assets, 
            ROA = net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets, 
           SIZE = the logarithm of total assets, 
     SGROW = the annual percentage change in sales, 
     RDADV = the sum of R&D expense and advertising expense divided by sales. 
            The coefficient on ANALYST, i.e., b1, will be positive and significant if H1 is 
supported, but will be negative and significant if H2 is supported.  We include DIV and 
DEBT in equation (1) to control for the effect of bondholder-shareholder conflicts over 
dividend policy on accounting conservatism (Ahmed et al., 2002).  Since firms demand 
for more accounting conservatism when bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend 
policy are severer, the coefficients on both DIV and DEBT, i.e., b2 and b3, are expected to 
be positive.     
           Following Ahmed et al. (2002), we also add other variables in the regression to 
control for profitability, size, sales growth, and growth opportunities.  Ahmed et al. 
(2002) argue that high profitable firms can better afford accounting conservatism.  Thus, 
earnings profitability may positively affect accounting conservatism.  The coefficient on 
ROA, i.e., b4, is expected to be positive when CONBM is used in the regression.  
However, we expect that b4 will be negative when CONAC is used in the regression 
because Ahmed et al. (2002) suggest that the mechanical, negative association between 
CONAC and ROA dominates the positive association between accounting conservatism 
and profitability.  Large firms have high political costs, resulting in high accounting 
conservatism (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981).  Thus, the coefficient on SIZE, i.e., b5, is 
expected to be positive.  Like Ahmed et al. (2002), we expect that the coefficient on 
SGROW, i.e., b6, will be negative or positive when CONAC or CONBM is used in the 
regression, respectively, because sales growth may positively affect either accruals or the 
market’s expectation of future growth reflected in CONBM.  Klein (2002) suggests that 
growth opportunities are positively associated with aggressive accounting choices.  
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Moreover, growth opportunities may be captured in CONBM.  Thus, the coefficient on 
RDADV, i.e., b7, is expected to be negative or positive when CONAC or CONBM is used 
in the regression, respectively.  To control for the industry-fixed effect and the year-fixed 
effect, we include both industry dummies and year dummies in the regression model.6  
We conduct the main analysis by estimating equation (2) on pooled data over the period 
1989 to 2006.   
           We also conduct several additional regression analyses.  First, we estimate 
equation (2) separately for each year to apply Fama-MacBeth test to avoid the 
autocorrelation of time-series data in the pooled regression.  Fama-MacBeth test is based 
on the separate estimation of equation (2) for each of 18 years, i.e., 1989-2006.7  .   
           Second, we run the two-stage regression to allow for the potential endogeneity of 
analyst coverage.  The relationship between accounting policy and analyst coverage is 
likely to be endogenous because analysts can self-select firms.  We estimate the first-
stage model as follows: 
  ANALYST = a0 + a1SPIND + a2DEBT + a3ROA + a4SIZE + a5RDADV + ε        (3)      
In equation (3), SPIND is a dummy variable coded “1” if a firm is included in the S&P 
500 index and “0” otherwise.  Following Yu (2008), we choose SPIND as the 
instrumental variable because it can capture the variations in analyst coverage that are 
exogenous to firms’ accounting choices.  We include DEBT, ROA, SIZE, and RDADV in 
equation (3) since prior research (e.g., Yu, 2008; Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006) 
suggests that these firm characteristics may affect analyst coverage.  The second-stage 
model (i.e., equation (2)) is estimated by replacing ANALYST with the fitted value of 
ANALYST from equation (3) (i.e., ANALYST_F).   
           Third, we examine whether the role of analysts in increasing accounting 
conservatism is dominated over or overlapped by the role of outside directors and 
institutional shareholders.  We consider these two competing governance mechanisms 
because they may affect managerial behavior in choosing accounting policy.  Klein 
(2002) finds that outside directors play an important role in constraining earnings 
management.  Koh (2007) suggests that long-term institutional shareholders can reduce 
aggressive earnings management.  Thus, equation (2) is expanded by including board 
independence and institutional shareholding: 
CON = b0 +b1ANALYST+ b2BRDIND + b3INSTHOLD + b4DIV + b5DEBT + b6ROA 
          + b7SIZE + b8SGROW + b9 RDADV + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε  (4) 
where 
      BRDIND  = board independence, measured as the proportion of outside directors on  
                          the board, 
 INSTHOLD
  
 = institutional shareholding, measured as the percentage of shares held by  
                          institutional investors.  
We collect the data of board independence and institutional shareholding from IRRC 
database.  Since IRRC database provides the data of institutional shareholding only for 
year 1999 to 2001, the sample size is reduced to 673 and 477 firm-year observations for 
CONAC and CONBM, respectively.  
           Fourth, we conduct the asymmetric loss recognition test based on Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005).  We estimate the following model:  
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ACC = b0 + b1DP+ b2CFO + b3DP*CFO + b4ANALYST + b5ANALYST*CFO 
           + b6ANALYST*DP*CFO + b7DEBT + b8ROA + b9SIZE + b10SGROW + b11 BM  
           + b12 SALES + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε                            (5) 
where  
        ACC = accruals, measured as income before extraordinary items less cash flow from  
                    operations deflated by the beginning total assets,  
          DP = a dummy variable coded “1” if cash flow from operations is negative and “0”  
                   otherwise, 
      CFO = cash flow from operations deflated by the beginning total assets, 
         BM = the book value of common equity divided by the market value of common  
                   equity, 
   SALES = sales divided by total assets.  
In equation (5), the coefficient on CFO is expected to be negative, while the coefficient 
on DP*CFO is expected to be positive (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  The positive 
coefficient on DP*CFO means that negative cash flow from operations is more timely 
recognized via accruals than positive cash flow from operations, which reflects 
accounting conservatism.  Thus, the coefficient on ANALYST*DP*CFO can capture the 
effect of analyst coverage on accounting conservatism.  If firms with high analyst 
coverage adopt more (less) conservative accounting choices, b6 is expected to be 
significantly positive (negative).  We add several firm characteristics including DEBT, 
ROA, SIZE, SGROW, BM, and SALES as prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002; Ahmed et al., 
2002) suggests that they may affect the level of accruals.  The coefficients on ROA, 
SGROW, and SLAES are expected to be positive, while the coefficients on DEBT, SIZE, 
and BM are expected to be negative.   
 
6.        Empirical results 
 
           Table II presents descriptive statistics of the variables.  The mean of CONAC is 
0.018, suggesting that on average accruals are negative.  The mean of CONBM is 0.221.  
Usually, there are about nine analysts following a firm, consistent with the average 
number of analyst followings in Yu (2008).  The mean return on assets is 0.001, which is 
close to that in Yu (2008).  The mean total assets of the sample firms are $359 million.    
 
Table II. Descriptive statistics 
             
Variable N Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 
CONAC 9,924 0.018 0.008 0.079 -0.019 0.039 
CONBM 5,148 0.221 0.259 1.099 -0.135 0.598 
ANALYST 9,924 9.279 6.000 8.970 3.000 13.000 
DIV 9,924 0.008 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.008 
DEBT        9,924 0.133 0.064 0.165 0.000 0.220 
ROA
 
9,924 0.001 0.048 0.192 -0.008 0.094 
SIZE
 
9,924 5.884 5.613 1.984 4.423 7.100 
SGROW
 
9,924 0.241 0.118 0.509 0.021 0.280 
RDADV
 
9,924 0.150 0.077 0.267 0.031 0.170 
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Notes:  CONAC is accrual-based measure of accounting conservatism, measured as the mean of total  
accruals deflated by total assets for year t-1 to t+1 where t is the year of interest, multiplied by -1.  CONBM 
is market-value-based measure of accounting conservatism, measured as the firm-specific bias component 
of the book-to-market ratio, which is estimated using equation (1).  ANALYST is analyst coverage, 
measured as the total number of analysts who issue forecasts of year t+1’s earnings per share for a firm 
during year t (Yu, 2008).  DIV is common dividends divided by total assets.  DEBT is long-term debt 
divided by total assets.  ROA = net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets.  SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets.  SGROW is the annual percentage change in sales.  RDADV is the sum of R&D 
expense and advertising expense divided by total assets.                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                           
           
           Table III reports Pearson correlations among the independent variables.  Large 
firms are followed by more analysts (r = 0.59).  Firms with high R&D and advertising 
intensity are less profitable (r = -0.53).  Since the absolute values of all correlation 
coefficients are less than 0.60, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a severe issue for the 
regression.          
 
Table III. Pearson correlations 
             
Variable DIV DEBT ROA SIZE SGROW RDADV 
ANALYST 0.229***     0.002      0.198*** 0.594*** -0.040*** -0.060*** 
DIV  0.025** 0.223*** 0.322*** -0.135*** -0.112*** 
DEBT      -0.022** 0.249*** -0.099*** -0.107*** 
ROA
 
   0.280*** -0.131*** -0.529*** 
SIZE
 
    -0.153*** -0.218*** 
SGROW
 
     0.276*** 
       
Notes: ***, ** significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
                                                                                                                                                            
  
           Table IV provides the main results on testing the hypotheses.  Columns 3 and 4 in 
Table IV report the results when the accrual-based measure of accounting conservatism is 
used as the dependent variable.  We find that the association between CONAC and 
ANALYST is significantly positive (t-statistic = 7.46, p-value < 0.01), consistent with H1 
but inconsistent with H2.  This suggests that firms adopt more conservative accounting 
choices when they are followed by more analysts.  Thus, the effect of analysts’ 
monitoring role on accounting conservatism dominates over that of analysts’ information 
intermediary role.  In addition, we find that CONAC is positively associated with DIV, 
consistent with the notion that firms with severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts over 
dividend policy employ more conservative accounting (Ahmed et al., 2002).  A strong 
negative relation between CONAC and ROA is documented, suggesting that the 
mechanical relation dominates the relation between accounting conservatism and 
profitability.  We find that large firms are more conservative in accounting choices when 
conservatism is measured by CONAC.  Contrary to the prediction, sales growth is 
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positively associated with CONAC.  As expected, firms with high growth opportunities 
have low CONAC.   
 
Table IV. The association between accounting conservatism and analyst coverage 
    
  
  
    CONAC     CONBM   
Variable 
Predicted 
sign Coefficient t-statistic 
 Predicted 
sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -0.010    -2.31**  ? -0.236 -2.62*** 
ANALYST +/-          0.001 7.46***  +/- 0.012 6.44*** 
DIV + 0.249 5.79***  + 2.305 3.02*** 
DEBT + -0.006     -1.26  + 0.364 3.79*** 
ROA
 
- -0.226 -53.50***  + 0.332   2.26** 
SIZE
 
+          0.001      2.91***  + -0.103 -10.64*** 
SGROW
 
-          0.004 2.88***  + 0.672 10.03*** 
RDADV
 
-        -0.016     -5.22***  + 0.119     0.80 
    
  
  
Industry dummies    Included    Included 
Year dummies 
  Included    Included 
    
  
  
N       9,924       5,148 
F-statistic   126.84***    37.95*** 
Adj R2      35.29%     20.99% 
    
  
  
Notes:   The regression model is equation (2).  ***, ** significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-
tailed tests).                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                     
           Columns 6 and 7 in Table IV present the results when CONBM is used as a proxy 
for accounting conservatism.  We find that CONBM is positively associated with 
ANALYST (t-statistic = 6.44, p-value < 0.01), supporting H1.  The results suggest that 
high analyst coverage can increase accounting conservatism.  We also find that CONBM 
is high when firms have severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy 
measured by either DIV or DEBT.  As opposed to CONAC, CONBM is positively 
associated with profitability.  The results show that CONBM is negatively associated with 
SIZE, inconsistent with the prediction.  Also, we document that CONBM is positively 
associated with SGROW.   
           Table V reports the results using Fama-MacBeth test.  When CONAC is used as 
the dependent variable, the results show that the mean coefficient on ANALYST is 
significantly positive (t-statistic = 4.70, p-value <0.01), consistent with H1.  Similar to the 
results using the pooled regression, CONAC is positively associated with DIV and SIZE, 
and is negatively associated with ROA and RDADV.  When accounting conservatism is 
measured by CONBM, we find a positive association between CONBM and ANALYST (t-
statistic = 3.86, p-value <0.01), suggesting that analyst coverage positively affects 
accounting conservatism.  We also find that CONBM is positively related to DIV, DEBT, 
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and SGROW.  Unlike the results of the main analysis, CONBM is only marginally 
significantly associated with SIZE, and is positively associated with RDADV.  
 
Table V. Fama-MacBeth test 
    
  
  
    CONAC     CONBM   
Variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Mean 
coefficient t-statistic 
 Predicted 
sign 
Mean 
coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -0.005     -0.63  ? 0.349      1.21 
ANALYST +/-          0.001 4.70***  +/- 0.011 3.86*** 
DIV + 0.250 4.91***  + 2.488  2.05* 
DEBT + 0.000      0.11  + 0.438 4.95*** 
ROA
 
- -0.223 -18.35***  + 0.433      1.46 
SIZE
 
+          0.002       2.44**  + -0.080 -1.84* 
SGROW
 
-          -0.002     -0.59  + 0.531 3.22*** 
RDADV
 
-        -0.018     -2.57**  + 0.295     2.63** 
    
  
  
Industry dummies    Included    Included 
    
  
  
      N            18           18 
  RMSE   0.062***    0.641*** 
    
  
  
Notes: ***, **, and * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
           Table VI presents the results on the two-stage model.  We find that CONAC is 
positively related to ANALYST_F (t-statistic = 2.89, p-value <0.01), which supports the 
hypothesis.  We also find that CONAC is positively related to DIV, SIZE, and SGROW, 
and is negatively related to ROA and RDADV.  Similarly, we document a positive 
relationship between CONBM and ANALYST_F (t-statistic = 2.50, p-value <0.05).  
Again, we find that CONBM is positively related to DIV, DEBT, ROA, and SGROW, and 
is negatively related to SIZE.  Thus, the results still hold after controlling for the 
endogeneity of analyst coverage.  
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Table VI. Two-stage regression 
    
  
  
    CONAC     CONBM   
Variable 
Predicted 
sign Coefficient t-statistic 
 Predicted 
sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -0.011    -2.32**  ? -0.260  -2.41** 
ANALYST_F +/-          0.001 2.89***  +/- 0.011   2.50** 
DIV + 0.253 5.86***  + 2.397 3.13*** 
DEBT + -0.004     -0.96  + 0.383 3.72*** 
ROA
 
- -0.225 -52.94***  + 0.411 1.96* 
SIZE
 
+          0.002   1.83*  + -0.097 -6.31*** 
SGROW
 
-          0.004 3.15***  + 0.666 10.48*** 
RDADV
 
-        -0.015     -5.21***  + 0.297     0.75 
    
  
  
Industry dummies    Included    Included 
Year dummies 
  Included    Included 
    
  
  
N       9,924       5,148 
F-statistic   125.14***    36.75*** 
Adj R2      34.98%     20.45% 
    
  
  
Notes:  ANALYST_F is the fitted value of ANALYST from equation (3).  The second-stage regression model 
is equation (2).  ***, **, and * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
           Table VII reports the results after controlling for the possible effects of board 
independence and institutional shareholding on accounting conservatism.  We still find 
that analyst coverage positively affects accounting conservatism measured by either 
CONAC or CONBM (t-statistic = 2.25 or 5.21, p-value < 0.05 or 0.01, respectively), 
consistent with H1.  Nevertheless, we do not document any significant evidence on the 
association of accounting conservatism with board independence and institutional 
shareholding.  Overall, these results suggest that it is less likely that analyst coverage is 
dominated over or overlapped by the competing governance mechanisms of boards and 
institutional shareholders in terms of increasing accounting conservatism.   
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Table VII. Control for board governance and institutional shareholding 
    
  
  
    CONAC     CONBM   
Variable 
Predicted 
sign Coefficient t-statistic 
 Predicted 
sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.036       2.44**  ? 0.704   2.26** 
ANALYST +/-           0.001       2.25**  +/- 0.032 5.21*** 
BRDIND + -0.007      -0.76  + -0.252    -1.13 
INSTHOLD + 0.007       0.76  + 0.179      0.92 
DIV + 0.306    2.34**  + 3.769      1.43 
DEBT + -0.027     -2.09**  + 0.157      0.52 
ROA
 
- -0.320 -23.44***  + -0.203    -0.46 
SIZE
 
+          -0.002     -1.20  + -0.192 -4.45*** 
SGROW
 
-           0.037 6.50***  + 0.668 3.33*** 
RDADV
 
-        -0.041     -2.73***  + 0.467     1.10 
    
  
  
Industry dummies    Included    Included 
Year dummies 
  Included    Included 
    
  
  
N          673         477 
F-statistic   36.99***    6.90*** 
Adj R2      58.20%     22.91% 
    
  
  
Notes: The regression model is equation (4).  BRDIND is board independence, measured as the proportion 
of outside directors on the board.  INSTHOLD is
 
institutional shareholding, measured as the percentage of 
shares held by institutional investors.  ***, ** significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests). 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
           Table VIII presents the results of the asymmetric loss recognition test.  Consistent 
with Ball and Shivakumar (2005), we find that the coefficient on CFO is negative, and 
that the coefficient on DP*CFO is positive.  Similarly, we find that the coefficient on the 
three-way interaction term ANALYST*DP*CFO is positive and significant (t-statistic = 
7.09, p-value < 0.01).  Thus, the extent to which negative cash flow from operations is 
more timely recognized via accruals than positive cash flow from operations (i.e., another 
proxy for accounting conservatism) is positively associated with analyst coverage.  This 
supports the hypothesis that firms with high analyst coverage adopt more conservative 
accounting choices.  In addition, we find that total accruals are positively associated with 
ROA and SALES, and are negatively associated with DEBT, SIZE, SGROW, and BM. 
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Table VIII. Asymmetric loss recognition test 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.023    3.44*** 
DP ? 0.055 18.35*** 
CFO - -0.602 -42.93*** 
DP*CFO + 0.230 11.34*** 
ANALYST ? 0.001 3.00*** 
ANALYST*CFO ?          -0.003 -2.76*** 
ANALYST*DP*CFO +/- 0.017 7.09*** 
DEBT - -0.020     -3.80*** 
ROA
 
+ 0.645 107.31*** 
SIZE
 
-          -0.005      -7.82*** 
SGROW
 
+          -0.020 -10.52*** 
BM - -0.015 -7.20*** 
SALES + 0.004                         2.40** 
    
Industry dummies                     Included 
Year dummies 
                   Included 
    
N                           9,582 
F-statistic   331.46*** 
Adj R2                          62.34% 
    
Notes: The regression model is equation (5).  ***, ** significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-
tailed tests). 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
7.        Conclusion 
 
           This study examines whether analyst coverage positively or negatively affects 
accounting conservatism.  We find strong evidence that analyst coverage is positively 
associated with accounting conservatism.  The results show that firms choose more 
conservative methods when they are followed by more analysts than when they are 
followed by fewer analysts.  We find similar results after allowing for issues including 
the autocorrelation of time-series data, the endogeneity of analyst coverage, and the effect 
of the competing governance mechanisms.  We also find that the extent to which negative 
cash flow from operations is more timely recognized via accruals than positive cash flow 
from operations (i.e., another proxy for accounting conservatism) is higher for firms with 
high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage.  Our findings suggest 
that the effect of analysts’ monitoring role on accounting conservatism is greater than that 
of analysts’ information intermediary role.   
           This study makes the following contributions to the literature.  First, this study 
provides an answer to the question of whether high analyst coverage increases or 
decreases accounting conservatism.  Since it is not clear whether analysts’ monitoring 
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role dominates over their information asymmetry role in firms’ accounting choice, it is 
warranted to document empirical evidence on this issue.  Second, our study extends the 
limited research on the corporate governance role of analyst coverage by focusing on 
conservative accounting choices.  This study provides further evidence on analysts’ 
governance role by examining the effect of analyst coverage on accounting conservatism.  
Third, this study also adds to the research into the economic determinants of accounting 
conservatism.  This is the first study to examine whether analyst coverage is an economic 
determinant of accounting conservatism.  Our study provides further evidence that 
corporate governance exhibits a positive impact on accounting conservatism.   
         This study provides some implications for practitioners.  Our study implies that 
financial analysts in the capital market may protect the interests of investors.  
Policymakers and regulators may increasingly support the development of the financial 
analyst profession as watchdogs.  Managers should constrain their opportunistic behavior 
as external governance mechanisms including analyst coverage can effectively monitor 
them.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
           1988 is chosen as the first year because firms did not report cash flow from operations before 1988, 
which is used in computing total accruals.  
2
           The sample size is reduced because six lagged years’ data are used in computing market-value-
based measure of accounting conservatism.    
3
             The year of interest includes 1989 to 2006. 
4
             I measure total accruals by including depreciation because accounting conservatism in 
depreciation calculation cannot be captured in total accruals before depreciation (Ahmed et al. 2002). .   
5
             The estimation for year t-1 to t+1 uses the data over the period t-7 to t+1. 
6
            An industry dummy is code “1” if a firm belongs to a two-digit industry from which there are at 
least 100 observations in the sample and “0” otherwise. 
7
             Year dummies are excluded because the estimation is based on the data for a specific year.  
